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This paper first discusses the past patterns of the national medical 
care expenditure and its future path. About 30 percent of the past 
growth was due to population aging and the remaining 70 percent 
was due to technological change. The medical expenditure is 
expected to increase by about 20 percent in 20 years due to 
population aging.   
The latter half of the paper focuses on a reform plan of the health 
insurance for the elderly and presents some policy recommendations. 
One of the most serious problems in the health care market is that 
virtually no agents evaluate the quality of medical services or help 
improve it. It has not been clarified whether the rising medical costs 
are the result of waste or of necessity. Reform should attempt to make 
insurers play a more active role in the health care market as informed 
agents of patients. Dramatic outsourcing of the health insurance 
business to the private sector should be promoted. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Japanese citizens have recently worried about the rising burden of medical costs. 
Frequent reports of medical malpractice and accidents indicate, however, that the 
quality of medical services does not match the rising bill. This paper aims to discuss 
how Japanese policy makers could control the cost and quality of medical services. To 
this end, the paper first examines the past behavior of the national medical care 
expenditure and its future path. Possible reforms to slush medical costs and improve the 
quality of medical care are then proposed.   
Per capita real medical expenditure is driven by two factors; a change in the 
population structure and the so-called “natural increase” (a change in input due to 
technological change). Section 2 of this paper shows that about 30 percent of the past 
growth was due to population aging and the remaining 70 percent was due to 
technological change. The paper also surveys the effect of population aging on future 
medical care expenditure and finds that medical expenditure will increase by around 20 
percent in 20 years due to population aging.   
Section 3 focuses on a reform of health insurance for the elderly and presents some 
policy recommendations. From the time the government started working on a 
fundamental reform plan of public health insurance, it took officials a very long time to 
assemble a reform plan of health insurance for the elderly. After failing to meet a 
deadline twice, the government and ruling parties finally reached an agreement of health 
care reform in November 2001. The agreed plan, however, has not resolved some 
fundamental problems. One of the most serious unresolved problems is that virtually no 
agents in the health care market evaluate the quality of medical services or help to 
improve it. It has not been clarified whether the rising medical costs are the result of 
waste or of necessity. Reforms should attempt to make insurers play a more active role 
in the health care market as informed agents of patients. Since the public sector has been 
dominating the health insurance business, dramatic outsourcing of the health insurance 
business to the private sector should be promoted.   
 - 2 - 
2.  The Effect of Aging on Medical Costs 
 
2.1 Past Experiences 
The national medical expenditure in 2000 was 3,036 billion yen, and a Japanese 
citizen spent an average of 239 thousand yen a year for medical care. As shown in 
Figure 1, the ratio of medical expenditure to GDP increased in the 1990s and reached 
6.3 percent in 1999.
1 Since the share of medical expenditure of the elderly has been 
growing, many people think that the aging of population is a major reason for the 
increasing medical costs. However, focusing only on population aging will result in 
overlooking another important source. Even if the ratio of the elderly population to the 
total population remains stable, the overall growth of medical expenditure, including the 
non-elderly, is possible.   
To determine the importance of the role of population aging in the increase in medical 
costs, Table 1 summarizes information from publications of the Ministry of Health, 
Labor, and Welfare and shows that the real per capita medical expenditure grew at a rate 
of 4.5 percent per annum from 1980 to 1999. The contribution of population aging is 
obtained by changing only the population structure keeping the medical cost of each age 
group constant. The annual growth rate that is attributed to the change in the population 
structure was 1.4 percent from 1980 to 1997. Population aging increased the real per 
capita medical cost by 27 percent during this period. Therefore, about 30 percent of the 
medical cost growth is due to population aging. The “residual” growth (3.1 percent per 
annum) is attributed to a change in medical technology.   
Table 1 reveals the following three points. First, population aging is not entirely 
responsible for the rising medical costs. Secondly, population aging in Japan contribute 
more to the rising medical costs than do population aging in other developed countries, 
as pointed by Niki (1995). For example, Cutler (1997) and Newhouse (1992) pointed 
out that the contribution of the change in the population structure in the United States 
                                                 
1  The medical care expenditure slightly decreased in 2000 due to the introduction of the 
public long-term care insurance. Before then a non-negligible part of population with 
disabilities had substituted medical services provided by health insurance for long-term 
care services. However, other data sources indicate that the upward trend of medical 
care costs has not qualitatively changed since 2000. Although resources devoted to both 
medical care and long-term care should be a focus of health policy for the elderly, issues 
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1980 9.4 8.6 8.6 1.0 7.5
1981 7.4 6.7 5.0 1.0 3.8
1982 7.7 7.0 7.0 1.2 5.7
1983 4.9 4.2 5.5 1.2 4.3
1984 3.8 3.2 5.2 1.2 4.0
1985 6.1 5.4 4.2 1.2 3.0
1986 6.6 6.1 5.4 1.2 4.1
1987 5.9 5.4 5.4 1.2 4.1
1988 3.8 3.4 2.9 1.3 1.6
1989 5.2 4.8 4.0 1.3 2.7
1990 4.5 4.2 3.2 1.6 1.5
1991 5.9 5.6 5.6 1.5 4.0
1992 7.6 7.3 4.8 1.6 3.0
1993 3.8 3.5 3.5 1.5 2.0
1994 5.9 5.7 3.8 1.5 2.1
1995 4.5 4.1 3.4 1.6 1.7
1996 5.8 5.6 4.8 1.7 3.0
1997 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.8 -0.5
1998 2.6 2.3 3.6 1.8 1.8
1999 3.7 3.5 3.5 1.6 1.9
2000 -1.9 -2.1 -2.3 1.7 -4.0
1980-1999
1) 5.4 4.9 4.5 1.4 3.1
Source: National Medical Care Expenditure  (Ministry of Health, Labor
and Welfare).
Note: 1) A simple average of growth rates of each year. Since the drop
of medical costs in 2000 was due to the shift of some long-term care
spending from health insurance payments to long-term care insurance

















Source: National Medical Care Expenditure, various issues, Ministry of Labor, Health and Welfare.
Note: The medical cost of those aged 15-44 for each year is normalized to be one.- 3 - 
was much smaller.
2  Thirdly, the impact of aging became bigger in a later period. Since 
population aging in Japan is expected to accelerate in the near future, the attention needs 
to be paid to the future consequences.   
Figure 2 shows the per capita medical expenditure by age group (0-14, 15-44, 45-64, 
65 and over) in different years. The medical cost of those aged 15-44 for each year is 
normalized to be one. The medical cost of those aged 65 and over exhibit a higher 
growth than those of other age groups; from 4.6 times as big as the those of people aged 




2.2 Future Projections 
If the elderly continue to incur higher medical costs than the non-elderly, the 
increasing aging population will raise the per capita medical costs of the entire 
population.  
The Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare periodically provides a projection of the 
future medical costs. However, the methodology used by the Ministry includes an 
awkward procedure, i.e., they extrapolate the recent nominal growth rate. The predicted 
medical costs in 2025 varied wildly among predictions. For example, according to the 
1994 projection, the medical cost in 2025 would be 141 trillion yen, but the 2001 
projection indicated that it would be 81 trillion yen. This dramatic decline of nominal 
medical costs reflects the recent low nominal growth of medical expenditure, which is 
in turn due to the disinflation and deflation of the Japanese economy.   
Since economists prefer a projection based on real costs, many alternative studies of 
estimating real medical costs have been conducted (for example, Iwamoto, Takeshita 
                                                 
2 Newhouse (1992) estimated that 15 percent of the growth between 1950 and 1987 
was explained by population aging. Cutler (1997) pointed out that population aging 
explained only 2 percent of the growth from 1940 to 1990.   
3 The elderly aged 70 and over had received free medical care from 1973 to 1983. In 
1983, a fixed amount of out-of-pocket payment by the elderly was introduced, although 
the amount was tiny. If the total medical cost responds to the out-of-pocket expenses, 
the increased cost associated with the increased burden in this period is puzzling. 
However, evidence from other reforms of out-of-pocket payment rule supports the 
conventional wisdom that the medial cost responds negatively to the out-of-pocket 
expenses (see Iwamoto and Kishida, 2001). I conjecture that other technological factors 
might then have a significant effect on the growth of medical costs for the elderly.   - 4 - 
and Bessho, 1997; Niki, 1995; Nishimura, 1997; Ogura, 1994; Ogura and Irifune, 1990; 
Tokita et al. 1997). To estimate the real expenditure, it is necessary to predict what the 
inflation rate and technological change will be in the future.
4 A conservative approach 
to predicting the future inflation rate of medical services is to assume it will be the same 
with the overall inflation rate. A more difficult problem is how to predict the future 
growth of medical service input. A naive assumption is that the real medical service 
input is proportional to the real income. When we combine these assumptions, the 
nominal medical costs for an average person are proportional to the nominal income. 
The effect of aging population is then isolated as follows. Take the recent data of 
medical costs of various age groups. Change only the population data to the projected 
future value (the government projection is commonly used). The total medical costs are 
the product of the per capita medical cost and the medical costs of an average person. 
Since the growth rate of the latter is equal to the income growth rate, the growth rate of 
the former reflects the change in the ratio of total medical expenditure to the income. 
When we focus on this ratio, we do not have to specify either the inflation rate or 
income growth rate.   
Table 2 summarizes the existing research, which calculated the future medical costs 
using the above-mentioned approach. These studies show quite a similar pattern. For 
projections in the early 21st century, Ogura and Irifune (1990) estimated that the 
national medical expenditure would grow by 13.6 percent from 2001 to 2021. Niki’s 
(1995) projections showed 18.5 percent from 2000 to 2025. The growth between 2000 
and 2020 was estimated as 22.7 percent by Nishimura (1997) and 19 percent by Tokita 
et al. (1997). A rough consensus is that the national medical expenditure will grow by 
about 20 percent in the first 20 years of this century.   
 
                                                 
4  More than 90 percent of national medical care expenditure is paid by the public health 
insurance with the officially determined fee schedule. The estimation of the inflation 
rate of medical services (shown in Table 1) is based mainly on the change in this 
payment schedule.   Table 2: Projections of Future Medical Costs
Ogura and Irifune (1990)
Fiscal Year Total Medical Costs Medical Costs per Capita
(trillion yen, in 1986 price) (yen, in 1986 price)
1986 15.23 (100) 125,196 (100)
2001 19.59 (128) 151,572 (121)
2021 22.26 (146) 179,397 (143)
Ogura (1995)
Fiscal Year Total Medical Costs Medical Costs per Capita
(trillion yen, in 1989 price) (yen, in 1989 price)
1989 17.49 (100) 142,075 (100)
2004 22.77 (130) 178,765 (121)
2024 25.41 (145)
Niki (1995)
Fiscal Year Total Medical Costs Medical Costs per Capita
(trillion yen, in 1990 price) (yen, at in 1990 price)
1990 20.61 (100) 166,720 (100)
2000 24.55 (119) 192,720 (116)
2010 27.31 (133) 209,420 (126)
2025 29.10 (141) 231,280 (139)
Iwamoto, Takeshita and Bessho (1997)
Fiscal Year Total Medical Costs Medical Costs per Capita
(trillion yen, in 1992 price) (yen, in 1992 price)
腩 A)
1992 21.13 (100) 169,826 (100)
2010 27.64 (131) 211,968 (121)
2025 29.52 (140) 234,623 (138)
腩 B)
2010 27.63 (131) 216,508 (127)
2025 29.54 (140) 244,288 (144)
Nishimura (1997)
Fiscal Year Total Medical Costs Medical Costs per Capita
(trillion yen, in 1994 price) (yen, in 1994 price)
1994 25.00 (100) 199,818 (100)
2000 27.86 (111) 218,707 (109)
2005 30.24 (121) 233,792 (117)
2010 32.03 (128) 245,634 (122)
2015 33.30 (133) 256,089 (128)
2020 34.18 (137) 266,313 (133)
2025 34.19 (137) 271,768 (135)
2030 33.72 (135) 274,209 (137)
2035 33.15 (133) 274,668 (137)
2040 33.63 (135) 286,725 (143)
Tokita et al. (1997)
Fiscal Year Total Medical Costs Medical Costs per Capita
(trillion yen, in 1993 price) (yen, in 1993 price)
1993 20.17 (100) 161,440 (100)
2000 22.51 (112) 177,395 (110)
2005 23.86 (118) 186,868 (116)
2010 25.08 (124) 196,516 (122)
2015 26.44 (131) 209,104 (130)
2020 26.79 (133) 215,817 (134)
2025 26.39 (131) 218,256 (135)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are normalized so that the bese year
has 100.
  Medical costs per capita of Ogura and Irifune (1990), Ogura (1995),
Nishimura (1997), Tokita et al. (1997), total medical costs of Niki
(1995) and Iwamoto, Takeshita and Bessho (1997), and case (B) of
Iwamoto, Takeshita, and Bessho (1997) are the author's calculation.
  Ogura and Irifune (1990) and Ogura (1995) relied on their own
population projections. Case (B) of Iwamoto, Takeshita and Bessho
(1997) relied on the official population projection as with January
1997. Other studies employed the official population projection as
with September 1992.- 5 - 
3.  Debates on a Comprehensive Reform of the Health Insurance for the Elderly 
 
3.1 Reform Debates Entangled 
Since the growth rate of medical expenditure has exceeded that of the national 
income, the financial condition of health insurance system has continuously deteriorated. 
The necessity of a comprehensive reform of the health insurance system has been 
recognized since the Medical Insurance Council of the former Ministry of Health and 
Welfare commenced a discussion in March 1995. The toughest problem to be tackled is 
how to finance the medical costs of the elderly, who spend much more and contribute 
less than other sectors of the population.   
Under the current system, workers and their families are enrolled in Employee’s 
Health Insurance (EHI), and retired workers and their families belong to the National 
Health Insurance (NHI), which is mainly for the self-employed and the elderly. If the 
NHI tries to maintain an independent budget, its financial situation will seriously 
worsen. The government, then, is forced to subsidize the NHI. When the Health Service 
for the Elderly (Roken in Japanese) was established in 1983, the financing scheme of the 
medical costs of the elderly was fundamentally changed. First of all, the Roken is in a 
unique position because it is responsible for only the provision of benefits, while other 
health insurance subsystems are responsible for both the provision of benefits and the 
collection of insurance premiums. After the establishment of the Roken, the elderly 
remain enrollees of existing systems, which they pay premiums, but they receive 
benefits from the Roken. The Roken itself does not collect a premium. The medical costs 
of the elderly are financed from transfers from other health insurance groups. Roughly 
speaking, each subsystem pays to the Roken in proportion to the number of their 
enrollees.
5 The medical costs of the elderly are effectively supported by the rest of the 
public health insurance subsystems. However, the EHI is not pleased to have to 
subsidize the Roken. The increased share of medical costs of the elderly has caused a 
substantial increase in transfers from other insurance groups, thus worsening the 
financial conditions of the EHI.   
From the time the former Ministry of Health and Welfare started to work on a reform 
plan of public health insurance in 1995, it took officials a very long time to assemble a 
                                                 
5  Actually, the exact formula of transfers is slightly complicated.   - 6 - 
concrete reform plan of health insurance for the elderly. When the out-of-pocket 
payment of employees and the elderly was raised in September 1997, the government 
could not provide a plan of fundamental reform and promised to deliver a plan by FY 
2001. After heated debates, the government did not reach a conclusion again, and then 
postponed the reform until FY 2002.   
To meet the new deadline, the policy makers had to finalize a plan in 2001. In the 
report published in March 2001, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare presented 
four candidate plans of a comprehensive reform of health insurance for the elderly. The 
first plan was to establish an independent health insurance group for the elderly with 
heavy governmental subsidization. The second plan was to move retired workers into 
the EHI. The third plan was to introduce a risk adjustment scheme among health 
insurance groups. The forth plan was to unite public health insurance subsystems and 
launch a new single insurance group for the total population.   
The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare proposed a reform plan in September 
2001. According to this plan, the eligible age of the Roken would be raised from 70 to 
75. A 10 percent coinsurance rate would be applied to elderly participants aged 75 and 
over (20 percent for those aged 70-74). Fifty percent of medical expenses would be 
subsidized by the national budget, while 30 percent of medical expenses is currently 
subsidized. The coinsurance rate for the employees would be raised from 20 percent to 
30 percent. The Ministry’s plan also proposed to introduce a cap system that would keep 
the growth rate of medical costs for the elderly within the growth rate of the per capita 
GDP (if the medical costs grew higher, the health insurance would automatically drop 
the price that they paid). The Ministry of Finance and the Council on Economic and 
Fiscal Policy each advocated a cap system that would keep the total medical cost 
growth within the rate of economic growth.
6  
In November 29, 2001, the government and ruling parties finally reached an 
agreement concerning the reform plan. While the increase in the eligible age for the 
Roken was in agreement with the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare plan, the hike 
of out-of-pocket expenses for the elderly was met with criticism. A 10 percent 
                                                 
6 This episode suggests that the health insurance reform was an extraordinary, 
complicated event, because it is very exceptional for the Ministry of Finance to propose 
its own reform plan about the policy that another ministry is in charge of.   - 7 - 
coinsurance rate would be applied to those aged 70 and over (20 percent for the 
high-income households).
7 The idea of the cap system, which was unpopular with 
doctors, was dropped from the plan.   
 
3.2 What went wrong? 
The agreed reform plan is a mismatch of compromises. It partially incorporates the 
first candidate of the March 2001 report by increasing the subsidies by the national 
budget. It also partially incorporates the second candidate of the report by moving 
retired workers aged 70-74 and their dependents to the Taishokusha Iryo, which is 
effectively a part of health insurance for employees.
8 The agreed reform plan does not 
give a final answer of how to finance the medical costs of the elderly. Neither does it 
solve the problem of the increasing medical costs. Therefore, another reform will be 
needed within a few years if medical costs continue to grow.   
The large delay of the overhaul of the health care system comes from addressing the 
problems in the wrong order. Since the total medical expenditure is not likely to be 
changed substantially by the current reform plan, reducing somebody’s burden will 
increase somebody else’s. The finance of health insurance is essentially a zero sum 
game. While a cap system will automatically cut expenses, its effect on the quality of 
medical service is ambiguous. Since Japan has virtually no workable quality evaluation 
system, there is no guarantee that the cap system will cut only inefficient medical 
treatments. Moreover, we will not be able to check whether the quality of the medical 
services will stay the same or decline. The problem that should be addressed first is how 
to make the provision system more transparent and efficient. Until people are convinced 
of the quality of medical services, a satisfactory fundamental reform of health insurance 
will not be realized.   
The consumer’s demand for better and cheaper services is not different between the 
health care market and other markets. In the market economy, usually, consumer choice 
puts pressure upon providers, thus resulting in the improvement of quality and the 
reduction of prices. However, due to asymmetric information, consumer sovereignty has 
                                                 
7 This hike was realized in October 2002. A 30 percent of coinsurance rate for 
employees was applied in April 2003.   
8 The Taishokusha Iryo currently consists of retired workers aged under 69 and their 
dependents.  - 8 - 
not been well established in the area of health care. A promising idea to remedy the 
absence of consumer sovereignty is to have a professional third party acting as an 
informed agent for patients. Managed care belongs to this idea; an insurer plays a more 
active role than in traditional insurance policies.
9  
A naive application of managed care will not be workable in Japan because a 
dominant part of health insurance is operated by the public sector, which is not 
supposed to become a driving force of the market mechanism. Japanese regulators have 
basically given up measuring the quality, and they have targeted the ratio of medical 
expenditure to the national income. As a result, the actions of improving the quality of 
services in Japan lag far behind those of the United States, where private companies run 
health insurance business. Our government has just started promoting Evidence-Based 
Medicine, which has already been incorporated into medical practices outside Japan.   
 
3.3 The Japanese Way of Promoting Managed Care 
Providers of medical services have not received a strong market force under the 
dominance of the public health insurance system.
10 Therefore, our health policy has to 
outsource a substantial part of the public health insurance business to the private sector 
and to make the role of insurers more active. An action toward this direction has been 
initiated not by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare but by the Regulatory Reform 
Council (Sogo Kisei Kaikaku Kaigi), which placed health care as one of the six most 
important areas of promoting regulatory reforms in 2001. Based on the plan by the 
Regulatory Reform Council, the Reform Work Schedule (Kaikaku Kotei Hyo, 
assembled by the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, September 2001) contains 
important items of facilitating the activities of insurers. The insurer will be able to do 
the ex post review of medical practice, while the current legislation forces them to 
delegate it to special public agencies (Shiharai Kikin and Kokuho Rengokai). The 
                                                 
9  Glied (2000) surveys issues in managed care.   
10 Japanese medical expenses vary widely among regions. The prefecture with the 
highest per capita medical costs spent 1.53 times as much as the prefecture with the 
lowest cost in 1999, even after adjusting for the difference in the population structure. 
The large regional variations have been considered as evidence that Japanese medical 
practices are not quite standardized. A recent report of the regional variations has 
pointed out that the excess capacity of medical institutions drives medical costs up by 
inducing the demand for medical care (Chiikisa Kenkyukai, 2001).   - 9 - 
insurer will also be able to make a contact directly with medical service providers and 
apply a different payment schedule from that determined by the public health insurance.   
When the reform actions advocated by the Reform Work Schedule are realized, the 
insurer will be given an opportunity to play a more active role in the health care market. 
Particularly, the design of a payment schedule will play an important role in improving 
the medical practice. The introduction of a prospective payment system (PPS) has been 
advocated in the reform of payment schedule because the insurer will evaluate the 
quality of providers and give them incentives through the reward based upon outcome 
rather than input.   
In 1990, the public health insurance first introduced a PPS into the inpatient fee of the 
elderly. The PPS was later introduced into other areas at a slow pace. What will be the 
consequence of the PPS? If medical service providers seek profit, the introduction of the 
PPS will result in a lower service input. Its effect on quality would be ambiguous, when 
the original fee-for-service payment distorts the behavior of providers. An early study of 
the consequences of the introduction of the PPS in 1990 is Takagi (1993), which 
provides a case study of a hospital. A comparison before and after the introduction of 
the PPS indicated that the hospital had substantially reduced the utilization of drugs and 
screening. In terms of the numbers of deaths at the hospital, the quality of medical 
services did not show a significant decline.   
An important difference from the US Medicare PPS is that Japanese providers choose 
the PPS or a fee-for-service schedule. While the choice cannot be given on a 
case-by-case basis, the providers will choose the PPS if the expected revenue under the 
PPS is higher than those under the fee-for-service schedule. Kawai and Maruyama 
(2000) focused on the introduction of PPS to outpatient care for chronic diseases of the 
elderly and outpatient care for infant children in April 1996, and they found that 
providers respond to incentives given by the PPS. A hospital that expected a lower 
average medical cost under the fee-for-service schedule would choose PPS. Since policy 
makers intended to involve many medical care providers in the PPS, the payments 
under the PPS became generous for hospitals that spend less resources on patients. 
Therefore, the PPS was not helpful in reducing medical costs. The mandatory 
application of PPS has to be considered as a policy option.   - 10 - 
4. Concluding  Remarks 
 
To determine whether medical costs can be cut without deteriorating the quality and 
how to do so, we need to have a satisfactory system to evaluate the quality of medical 
care. Thus creation of a workable evaluation system should be given top priority.   
A market-oriented approach, competition trough a choice by informed agents of 
patients will help to improve the efficiency of health care provision. The public 
operation of health insurance has deprived the vital activities of the private sector. The 
introduction of managed care into the world governed by publicly operated universal 
health insurance will require a different strategy from that needed in a world dominated 
by private health insurance. Therefore, a naive imitation of US experiences may not be 
workable, and the Japanese policy makers will have to design a system that fits the 
Japanese situation. The provision and financing of health care varies among countries. 
The ongoing Japanese experience will help us understand the interaction of the market 
and institutions more thoroughly.   
In policy debates, a totally ignored issue is whether we have to pre-fund the health 
insurance against the expected rise of future medical expenses; some academic scholars, 
however, have discussed it (Iwamoto, 2002; Nishimura, 1997; and Suzuki, 2000). Since 
we have more problems to address than problems resolved, continued effort will be 
necessary to pursue a better health policy.   - 11 - 
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